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Abstract: The Moulin-Shenker rule (Sprumont (1998)) is a nonlinear solution
concept for solving heterogeneous cost sharing problems. The ﬁrst part of the paper
shows an axiomatic characterization of this solution using bounds on cost shares
and consistency. The second part is devoted to diﬀerential games for heterogeneous
production problems. It is shown for 2-player games that by an appropriate choice
of the game dynamics there is essentially a unique Markov perfect Nash equilibrium.
An axiomatic analysis follows for the appropriate game dynamics, which leads in
turn to a strategic characterization of the Moulin-Shenker rule.
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1. Introduction
This paper focuses on the problem of allocating the cost of usage of a production facility
for several outputs that is jointly owned by a ﬁxed group of agents. Each output of the
technology is personal in the sense that each of the agents is interested in a diﬀerent good.
A cost function c summarizes the relation between the level of the outputs and the min-
imal (monetary) input that is needed to generate this level. Given a proﬁle of individual
demands (q1,q2,...,qn), qi being a real number indicating the demand of agent i for good
i, we seek to distribute total costs c(q1,q2,...,qn). The more eligible devices will be sen-
sible to the level of individual demands and the cost structure. The vast majority of the
1Department of Quantitative Economics, Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, University of Ams-
terdam. e: mkoster@uva.nl, phone: ++31-205254226.literature on heterogeneous cost sharing problems encompasses the study of so-called addi-
tive mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that behave as linear operators with respect to the cost
structure. Examples include the Aumann-Shapley mechanism (Aumann-Shapley (1974),
Billera and Heath (1982)), Shapley-Shubik mechanism (Shubik (1962)), and the more re-
cent Friedman-Moulin mechanism (Friedman and Moulin (1999), Yanovskaya (2004))).2
Examples of non-additive solutions for heterogeneous cost sharing problems are the are
the ordinal proportional rule (Sprumont (1998)) the ordinally proportional rule (Sprumont
(1998)), the radial serial rule (Koster et al. (1998)), and the Moulin-Shenker mechanism
(Sprumont (1998)). The above cost sharing mechanisms are generalizations of mechanisms
on the class of single-good or homogeneous cost sharing problems, where full comparison
of the diﬀerent units of the goods is legitimate, if not compelling. In this sense, the
Aumann-Shapley mechanism and the ordinal proportional mechanism extend the average
cost sharing mechanism (Moulin and Shenker (1994)), whereas the radial serial rule and
the Moulin-Shenker mechanism generalize the serial cost sharing mechanism (Moulin and
Shenker (1992), Moulin (1996)). In this paper these serial extensions are of particular
interest.
The ﬁrst part of the paper is devoted to an axiomatic characterization of the Moulin-
Shenker mechanism. This mechanism seems a special candidate in the class of solutions
that satisfy ordinality. This property, introduced by Sprumont (1998), requires from a
solution that it does not depend on conventions used to measure an agent’s demand. It
therefore requires from a solution that it is invariant against essentially any transformation
of measuring scales. Ordinality therefore represents a strengthening of the common prop-
erty of scale invariance, that requires invariance with respect to linear transformations of
scale. Examples of ordinal solutions are the Shapley-Shubik-, radial serial-, and Moulin-
Shenker mechanism. In this respect the strength of the axiom should be stressed: the
Aumann-Shapley mechanism is only scale invariant, and the Friedman-Moulin mechanism
not even that. Sprumont (1998) provides very compact characterization of the Moulin-
Shenker rule that does not include any notion of ordinality, but a property called serial
principle and the rather technical partial diﬀerentiability. The serial principle extends the
property independence of larger demands of the serial mechanism and seems to be the
most essential feature for serial cost sharing, by which the smaller agents are protected
against possibly excessive behavior of the larger demanders. However, partial diﬀeren-
tiability lacks any intuitive interpretation. This paper presents a characterization that
interchanges the serial principle with the similar self-consistency and avoids the diﬀeren-
tiability axiom by inclusion of the following axioms: (a) scale invariance, (b) continuity,
and (c) upperbound on cost shares. Continuity requires stability with respect to small
changes in demands, and the upperbound property declares a maximal solidarity level for
each agent in the sense that it determines a maximal price that an agent is willing to pay
based on the marginal costs that are actually faced.
The second part of the paper is devoted to a simple model of integral production and
2For further references see Moulin (2002) for an overview
2cost sharing through diﬀerential games. It is assumed that a benevolent planner designs
a game in which the agents are continuously required to state their interest in having
extra production or not. Then these demands are used as inputs for an underlying system
dynamics that describes how the production levels for the diﬀerent goods change over
time: each agent gets his extra demanded units and pays for the corresponding additional
marginal cost. During the game the planner sees to it that each player is fully informed
about the state of the game. Then if no agent requests more units, the game ends. The
utility of an agent is non-decreasing in the level of good obtained and quasi-linear and
non-increasing in the corresponding cost share. Basically the planner may infuence the
outcome in the game by setting up a suitable combination of system dynamics and con-
trol spaces. This procedure mimicks the ’push the button’ idea underlying the serial cost
sharing rule for homogeneous technologies.3 It is assumed that the players use Markov
strategies, that is, each is endowed with a fullﬂedged action plan that consists of an ac-
tion in every contingency of the state of the game. A ﬁrst result for two-player games
is that for certain rules of the game, i.e. for certain combinations of dynamics and con-
trol spaces, there exists always a unique Markov perfect Nash equilibrium. It is shown
that games can be deﬁned such that the equilibrium trajectories are those underlying the
Friedman-Moulin- and Moulin-Shenker cost sharing mechanism. The second result shows
that the unique game dynamics that guarantees uniqueness of Markov perfect Nash equi-
librium, scale invariance in equilibrium and lowerbounds on equilibrium utilities, lead to
the Moulin-Shenker path as equilibrium trajectory. In particular, this shows the imple-
mentation of the Moulin-Shenker mechanism and a ﬁrst strategic characterization of this
solution. Moreover, for homogeneous problems this result corresponds to the strategic
results of Moulin and Shenker (1992) as the equilibrium end-state in the dynamic pro-
duction game corresponds to the homogeneous equilibrium quantities of the serial cost
sharing mechanism.
Overview of the paper: Section 2 discusses the basic cost sharing model and formal
notation. Section 3 discusses the most important solutions and key properties in this
paper. Section 4 provides an axiomatic characterization of the Moulin-Shenker rule using
the properties in Section 3. Section 5 introduces the basic framework for dynamic pro-
duction games and discusses equilibrium properties for the special class of autonomous
games. Section 6 continues by characterizing the appropriate game dynamics which leads
to a characterization of the Moulin-Shenker equilibrium.
2. The cost sharing model
Throughout the paper we will concentrate on a ﬁxed and ﬁnite group of agents N =
{1,2,...,n}. The collective N jointly owns some production facility for some set of goods.
The output goods are personalized in the sense that there is at most one interested agent
for each output. So we can speak of the set of goods N, where good i ∈ N is identiﬁed
3See Moulin and Shenker (1992).
3with agent i ∈ N. A particular level of demanded output is then be described by a vector
q ∈ RN
+, where the i-th coordinate qi is the demand of agent i for good i. The zero element
in RN
+ is denoted 0. Then the demand space is partially ordered by the natural ordering ≤.
For all q,q0 ∈ RN, q < q0 holds if and only if qj ≤ q0
j for all j ∈ N with strict inequality for at
least one coordinate. Whenever qj < q0
j for all j ∈ N then we write q  q0. For q1,q2 ∈ RN
let q1∨q2,q1∧q2 ∈ RN be deﬁned by (q1∨q2)i = max{q1
i ,q2
i },(q1∧q2)i = min{q1
i ,q2
i } for
i ∈ N. The power set of N is denoted by P(N). For q ∈ RN,S ∈ P(N), qS is the demand
proﬁle obtained from q, where the demands of the players in N\S are set to 0. The
demand proﬁle out of q ∈ RN
+ where the demand of a player i is interchanged with t ∈ R+





i∈N qi = 1
	
,
and the Euclidean norm of a vector q ∈ RN
+ by kqk.
We assume that all information about the costs involved with bringing production up
to a certain level is given by a cost function c : RN
+ → R+. In this paper we will only be
concerned with cost functions c that are continuously diﬀerentiable and increasing, i.e. if
x < y then c(x) < c(y). Moreover the partial derivatives of c, Dic, are supposed to be
Lipschitz continuous and bounded away from 0 and ∞, i.e. there are a(c),b(c) > 0 such
that for all x ∈ RN
+
(1) a(c) ≤ Dic(x) ≤ b(c) for all i ∈ N.
In addition there are no ﬁxed costs, which amounts to the condition c(0) = 0. The class
of all such cost functions is denoted by C; C+ is the set of convex cost functions in C
and C++ ⊆ C+ consists of all strictly convex elements. A cost function c ∈ C is called
normalized if Dic(0) = 1 for all i ∈ N.
A cost sharing problem is an ordered pair (q,c) ∈ RN
+ × C. The class of all cost sharing
problems is denoted by G. A cost sharing rule or cost sharing mechanism is a mapping
µ : G → RN




i∈N µi(q,c) = c(q).
3. Cost sharing mechanisms and properties
The basic distinction between the heterogeneous and homogeneous models is that in the
ﬁrst one asymmetries in the cost function may arise. Most eligible cost sharing mechanisms
in the literature treat these asymmetries by relating an agents cost share to some measure-
ment of related marginal costs. For example, the Aumann-Shapley mechanism calculates
average marginal costs along the diagonal path towards the ﬁnal production level. The
Friedman-Moulin serial extension determines cost shares for (q,c) through measuring the
marginal cost along the path γq deﬁned by γq(t) = teN ∧q for all t ∈ R+, such that agent







4When the argument of γq is seen as a time parameter, it can be considered to describe a
real-time production process.







if t ≥ 0 and γi(t) < qi,
0 else.
It can be shown that there is a unique solution γq,c to these equalities such that γq,c(0) = 0.
Essentially, this is due to Lipschitz continuity of each 1/Dic together with condition (1), see
Coddington and Levinson (1955)).4 Needless to say that this curve γq,c heavily depends on
the demand proﬁle q and the cost function c ∈ C. The solution γq,c can be interpreted as a
production device. Suppose that the intensity at which an agent i is served by means of the
plan γq,c at moment t is measured by the corresponding marginal cost Dic(γq,c(t))Diγq,c(t).
Then γq,c can be intuitively interpreted as a device by which goods are distributed with
equal intensity for those agents that are not fully served at t, since for those agents i,
it holds Dic(γq,c(t))Diγq,c(t) = 1. The Moulin-Shenker rule now charges agent i for the
marginal costs Dic along the production device γq,c in the cost sharing problem (q,c).
Deﬁnition 3.1 Let (q,c) ∈ G. The Moulin-Shenker rule µms determines the individual
cost shares by taking the integral of all marginal cost along the curve γq,c, which solves






Example 3.2 Consider the cost sharing problem (q,c) with N = {1,2},q = (10,10),
and c is the cost function on the block B = [0,(15,15)] deﬁned by c(t1,t2) = e2t1+t2 − 1.
In order to determine the cost shares µms
1 (q,c) en µms
2 (q,c) we ﬁrst solve the diﬀerential
equation (2). We calculate the partial derivatives on B,
D1c(t1,t2) = 2e2t1+t2 = 2D2c(t1,t2) for all (t1,t2) ∈ B.
So according to γq,c, until one of the demands is reached, twice as much of good 2 is
produced relative to the production of good 1. So γq,c can be taken such that
γq,c(t) =

(t,2t) if t ≤ 5,
(t,10) for 5 < t ≤ 10.
Then this amounts to the cost shares
µms





1 (q,c) = µms
2 (q,c) + c(γq,c(10)) − c(γq,c(5)) = e30 − 1
2(e20 + 1).





Sprumont (1998) argues that cost sharing mechanisms should not depend on conventions
used to measure the individual demands. This is expressed by the notion of ordinality,
that requires that a cost sharing mechanism is invariant under all ordinal transformations
of the cost sharing problem. For our purposes, we need only the more familiar and weaker
notion of scale invariance, which imposes independence of rescaling units of the measuring
scales. For instance, if the output of some good is measured by weight, scale invariance
tells us that the cost shares should not depend on the fact that we expressed the amounts
in kilos instead of tons. We like to stress the gap between ordinality and scale invariance:
ordinality requires also invariance with respect to all non-linear increasing transformations
of the measuring scales.
Deﬁnition 3.3 A function f : RN
+ → RN
+ is a positive linear transformation of scales
if there is α ∈ RN
++ such that f(y) = (α1y1,...,αnyn) for all y ∈ RN
+. A cost sharing
mechanism µ is scale invariant (SI) if for all such mappings f and all cost sharing problems
(q,c) ∈ G it holds that µ(q,c) = µ(f(q),c ◦ f−1).
In the subsequent analysis a minimum stability from mechanisms is required, which is
formalized by continuity, that requires robustness of a rule with respect to small changes in
the data that is used to model the cost sharing problem. To be precise, small perturbations
of the demand proﬁle should not result in large changes in the cost shares:
Deﬁnition 3.4 A cost sharing mechanism µ is continuous (CONT) if for all c ∈ C, the
mapping q 7→ µ(q,c) is continuous on RN
+.
Unequal cost shares point at the fact that agents are not considered to be symmetric in
the cost sharing problem at hand. The size of a demand and the cost structure play an
essential role here. Intuitively it makes sense to judge a good more expensive than another
if the marginal costs of the ﬁrst are higher than the other, always. The more eligible cost
sharing mechanisms are fully consistent with this idea in the sense that the cost share of
an agent increases with the corresponding marginal costs. In this way the marginal cost
functions are taken as benchmarks in judging asymmetries in cost sharing problems. If
this is taken as a starting point, one could ask to what extent cost shares should relate to
the marginal costs. This leads us to focus on the following property, that requires that an
agent never pays more than the related marginal cost function could support.
Deﬁnition 3.5 A cost sharing mechanism µ satisﬁes upperbound (UPP) if for all cost
sharing problems (q,c) ∈ G it holds that for all i ∈ N
(4) µi(q,c) ≤ qi max
y∈[0,q]
Dic(y).
6Note that the maximum over [0,q] exists by continuity of the partial derivatives. Bounds
on cost shares are also discussed in the literature on homogeneous literature, see e.g. Koster
(2002) and Hougaard and Petersen (2001).
Though UPP can be considered weak as a characterizing property, it is strong enough
to imply other more frequently used properties:
(1) UPP implies no exploitation, i.e. zero demanders pay nothing, since qi = 0 implies
that µi(q,c) ≤ maxy∈[0,q] Dic(y) = 0 and µi(q,c) ≥ 0.
(2) UPP implies linearity, i.e. for linear cost functions the cost shares of the agents are
linear in demand. To be more precise, if c ∈ C on [0,q] is given by c(y) =
P
i∈N αiyi for
some α ∈ RN
++, then UPP implies µi(q,c) = αiqi for all i ∈ N. The next lemma essentially
shows that if a problem is almost linear, and even homogeneously so, then under UPP
the cost sharing mechanism behaves almost linearly. A proof is found in the appendix.
Lemma 3.6 Consider a cost sharing problem (q,c) ∈ G with Dic(0) = 1 for all i ∈ N.








where eN ∈ RN
+ is the vector with all coordinates 1.
In the next section, the Moulin-Shenker cost sharing mechanism will be singled out from
a class of cost sharing mechanisms that have the serial principle in common. The serial
principle prevents the smaller agent to get overexposed to the consequences of contingent
excessive behavior of other agents. This principle was formulated for the homogeneous
case by Moulin and Shenker (1992a) as independence of size of larger demands. The corre-
sponding formulation makes use of intercomparison of individual demands. But, typically,
the heterogeneous model case lacks a natural way of ordering demands such that they
can be compared in a direct way. Still, if a mechanism is singled out for some fairness
properties, then there is just one consistent way of comparing the demands, and that is
by comparing the size of the corresponding cost shares for the problem at hand. The
serial principle then urges that once the mechanism values the demand of an agent i lower
than that of agent j, any further increase of agent j’s demand should have no eﬀect at
all on agent i’s cost share. This idea is due to Sprumont (1998). Formally, A cost shar-
ing mechanism satisﬁes the serial principle if for all cost sharing problems (q,c) ∈ G it
holds that for all i ∈ N and j ∈ N\{i} with µj(q,c) ≥ µi(q,c) it holds that for t ≥ qj,
µi((q−j,t),c) = µi(q,c).
In general, though the names are quite suggestive, being a serial extension is not suf-
ﬁcient for a method to satisfy the serial principle. The Friedman-Moulin rule illustrates
this distinction; it is a serial extension only.
7Note that in our setting the serial principle implies positivity, i.e. qi > 0 implies
µi(q,c) > 0 for all i ∈ N and all problems (q,c) ∈ G. For every non-positive mecha-
nism possibly free-riders enter the picture. Any increase of any agent’s demand causes a
rise of total cost, so the impact on total cost of any non-zero demander is considered to
be positive. Consequently, positivity can be considered as compelling for our purposes.
It is easily seen that for every positive cost sharing mechanism the content of (5) is





= 1 for all i,j ∈ N.
Moulin and Shenker (1992) discuss the property free lunch which combines a mild form
of justice with a weak form of consistency (see also Kolpin (1994) and Thomson (1990,
1995)). To generalize this idea we develop the notion of self-consistency. This notion
makes it possible to link outcomes for problems of diﬀerent size.
Essentially, a cost sharing mechanism is used as an instrument of evaluation; the agent
with the larger cost share can be considered to have a larger demand. In this way, for a
problem (q,c), all the demands are equally valued by a cost sharing mechanism µ if and
only if µi(q,c) = µj(q,c) for all i,j ∈ N.
Fix a cost sharing problem (q,c) and a cost sharing mechanism µ. Suppose that we
provide all agents with equally valued parts of their demands; agent i gets di ≤ qi such
that µi(d,c) = µj(d,c) for all i,j ∈ N. Then the reduced cost sharing problem is deﬁned
by the proﬁle of unfulﬁlled demands q − d, and the cost data for any level of production
beyond d as is summarized by cd. Now self-consistency allows for determining the ﬁnal
cost shares by independently solving the problems (d,c) and (q − d,cd) and taking the
sum over the corresponding outcomes.
In the same spirit we deal with those situations where there are some zero demanders.
It is reasonable to require that just their presence should have no eﬀect on the allocation
of costs for the other agents. Suppose again that d is a demand proﬁle smaller than q,
such that the non-zero demanders are equally evaluated by the mechanism µ. Then self-
consistency proposes µ(q,c)S = µ(d,c)S +µ(q −d,cd)S, where S is the set of the non-zero
demanders for q. So, if cost shares diﬀer, then this is not due to the part of the problem
that the agents are equally charged for, but due to asymmetries in the related reduced
problem.
Deﬁnition 3.7 A cost sharing mechanism µ satisﬁes self-consistency (SCONS) if for all
cost sharing problems (q,c) ∈ G such that qN\S = 0N\S for some S ∈ P(N) and d ≤ q
such that µi(d,c) = µj(d,c) for all i,j ∈ S,
µ(q,c)S = µ(d,c)S + µ(q − d,cd)S.
84. Characterization of the Moulin-Shenker rule
Next we will deﬁne the class of path generated cost sharing methods. The idea is in fact
adopted from Sprumont (1998), but notations are diﬀerent.
For S ⊆ N a path in RS
+ is a continuous mapping π : R+ → RS
+ with π(0) = 0. The path π
is increasing if πi(t) < πi(t0) for all i ∈ S if only t < t0. In our setting, with the argument
of π thought of as being time, an increasing path may be considered as a program for
production. At time t an amount of good i equal to πi(t) units is produced for agent i.
Suppose that for each pair (d,c) ∈ G we have an increasing path πd,c,S for S such that for
each q ∈ RS
+ there is t ∈ R+ with πd,c,S(t) > q. Such a path will be considered to describe
a ﬁctitious production plan for coalition S from level d ∈ RN
+. Possibly such a plan will
depend on the exogenous information of costs that is summarized by c ∈ C.
Π is deﬁned as the collection of all those paths, one for each triple (d,c,S) ∈ RN
+×C×P(N).
We will refer to Π as a path collection. A path collection Π deﬁnes for each cost sharing
problem (q,c) ∈ G a production plan, casu quo a path π for N in the following way.
We start at production level 0. Initially, we take the path for N, π0,c,N as a production
device, telling us for each moment in time what is produced for the individual agents. So
follow π0,c,N up to the earliest moment t1 that some agents M1 ⊆ N are satisﬁed, i.e.
π
0,c,N
i (t1) = qi for all i ∈ M1.
Deﬁne π on [0,t1] by π(t) = π0,c,N(t). Let d1 denote the total demand that is processed
so far, d1 = π(t1). Still, an agent i ∈ N\M1 needs qi − d1
i units of good i in order to be
satisﬁed. Next, we take πd1,c,N\M1 as the additional production plan for N\M1 until the
ﬁrst moment t2 that some agents M2 ⊆ N\M1 are satisﬁed, i.e.
πd1,c,N\M1(t2) = qi − d1
i for all i ∈ M2.
The deﬁnition of π is now completed up to moment t1 + t2 by
π(t + t1) := d1 + (0M1,πd1,c,N\M1(t)) for all t ∈ (0,t2].
Let d2 = π(t1 + t2). Follow the production device πd2,c,N\(M1∪M2) until moment t3 where
the ﬁrst agents M3 ⊆ N\(M1 ∪ M2) are fulﬁlled with their remaining needs qM3 − d2
M3.
Then deﬁne, for all t ∈ (0,t3],
π(t + t1 + t2) = d2 + (0M1∪M2,πd2,c,N\(M1∪M2)(t)).
In this way we can go on and complete the deﬁnition of π. We just proceed by determining
time levels t4,t5,... and corresponding groups of agents M4,M5,... until the ﬁrst moment
t1 + ... + tk such that there are no remaining demanders, i.e. N\(M1 ∪ ... ∪ Mk) = ∅.
Note that π(t) = q when t > t1 + t2 + ... + tk. We will say that π is the path for (q,c)
generated by Π.
Deﬁnition 4.1 The solution for the cost sharing problem (q,c) ∈ G generated by a path
collection Π is the vector µΠ(q,c) ∈ RN
+ deﬁned as follows. Let π be the path for (q,c)
9generated by Π. Suppose that according to π agent i is satisﬁed at moment ti. Without
loss of generality, assume that ti ≤ tj whenever i ≤ j for all i,j ∈ N. We split the
successive cost increments c(π(ti+1))−c(π(ti)) equally among the agents requiring service
on the interval (ti,ti+1]. By assumption this is the set of agents {i+1,i+2,...,n}. Then
this boils down to µΠ
1 (q,c) =
c(π(t1))
N as the cost share for agent 1, while the cost shares
for the other agents i ∈ N are inductively deﬁned through
µΠ
i (q,c) = µΠ
i−1(q,c) +
c(π(ti)) − c(π(ti−1))
n − i + 1
.
By varying over all cost sharing problems in G this yields a cost sharing mechanism µΠ,
generated by the path collection Π.
We will also say that in the above deﬁnition the cost shares for the problem (q,c) are
generated by Π. Note that for a path generated method only the images of the paths
count, irrespective of the parametrization. Keeping this in mind, one should have no
problem with the following.
Lemma 4.2 Let f : RN
+ → RN be a linear transformation of measuring scales. Suppose
µ is a scale invariant cost sharing mechanism that is generated by a path collection
Π = {πd,c,S |(d,c,S) ∈ R × C × P(N)}. If the cost shares for (q,c) ∈ G are generated
by π, then the cost shares for (f−1(q),c ◦ f) are generated by f−1 ◦ π.
A simple but important observation is that each path generated method indeed satisﬁes
the serial principle. Sprumont (1998) proves the converse of this statement for all contin-
uous mechanisms. The next lemma is similar, its proof is rather lengthy postponed till
the appendix.
Lemma 4.3 A continuous cost sharing mechanism satisﬁes no exploitation and self con-
sistency only if it is generated by a collection of paths.
Especially, Lemma 4.3 shows that a continuous cost sharing mechanism with the properties
self consistency and no exploitation satisﬁes the serial principle. However, self consistency
is fundamentally diﬀerent from the serial principle. For instance, it is easy to deﬁne path
generated cost sharing rules, that satisfy no exploitation and continuity and fail to obey
self consistency. Furthermore, splitting cost equally for all cost sharing problems deﬁnes
a self consistent rule that neither satisﬁes no exploitation nor the serial principle.
Fix a cost function c ∈ C. For each d ∈ RN
+, let cd ∈ C be the cost function that relates
each increase of demand q after d to the corresponding incremental cost, i.e. cd(q) =
c(d+q)−c(q) for all q ∈ RN. An ordered pair (d,S) ∈ RN
+ ×P(N) gives rise to a system
of diﬀerential equations like equation (2). Let γ : R+ → RN
+ be such that for all t ∈ R+





By the regularity assumptions on c this system has a unique solution, which we will
denote by γd,c,S. Then by varying over all triples (d,c,S) ∈ RN
+ × C × P(N) this gives
rise to a path collection Γ, which in turn generates the Moulin-Shenker rule. Note that
γd,c,S = γ0,cd,S for all (d,c,S) ∈ RN
+ × C × P(N).
Sprumont (1998) shows that among the class of all path generated methods there is only
one for which all partial derivatives with respect to the demand input exist, and that is
µms. Actually, it can be shown that µms is continuously diﬀerentiable.
We are now ready for the main result in this section.
Theorem 4.4 There is only one continuous, self consistent and scale invariant cost shar-
ing mechanism that satisﬁes no exploitation and equation (5), and that is the Moulin-
Shenker rule.
Corollary 4.5 There is only one continuous, self consistent and scale invariant cost
sharing mechanism that satisﬁes upperbounds, and that is the Moulin-Shenker rule.
Proof. This implied by Lemma 3.6.
At this point it is important to realize that the above proofs suﬃce for a full charac-
terization of µms on the classes G+ or G++. The basic operations that are used are linear
transforms which keep the nature of the problem intact.
5. Dynamic cost sharing games
For homogeneous good models there are results concerning cost sharing games – see
Moulin and Shenker (1992), Moulin (1996), Kolpin (1996). These games are all one-shot
games. For heterogeneous good models we present a cost sharing game using a diﬀerential
game, i.e., a dynamic game in continuous time. The agents are players in the dynamic
game whose actions inﬂuence a dynamical system that in turn determines a production
path. The game ends when no player has a request for additional production. Then each
obtains the corresponding end-state production level of his good and he has to pay for the
total of marginal costs along the production path.
We will make the following assumptions:
• The cost functions are chosen from C++.
11• Each agent is endowed with quasi-linear preferences over combinations of amounts
of good Yi and costs. Then these preferences are summarized by utility functions
{Hi}i∈N such that
Hi(qi,ci) = Fi(qi) − ci,
for some non-decreasing function Fi. Moreover, we will assume that Fi is dif-
ferentiable and concave, so that the function fi = F0
i is continuous and non-
increasing. In particular, it is assumed that the preferences of the players are
time-independent.
The state of the game is described by a vector x(t) ∈ RN
+ which describes the total
production for each agent at time t; xi(t) is the amount of good Yi that has been produced
for agent i by time t. Suppose that x(t0) = x0 for some t0 ∈ R+. The non-decreasing path
t 7→ x(t) is ﬁnite if it locks in, i.e. there exists x ∈ RN
+ such that limt→∞ x(t) = x∗. Then




(fi(xi(t)) − Dic(x(t))) ˙ xi(t) dt.
Deﬁne the proﬁtable region for player i as the set Ri = {x ∈ R2
+
  fi(xi) ≥ Dic(x)}.
A strategy of a player i ∈ N in Γg,c(x0,t0) is a mapping ui that assigns to each pair
(x,t) ≥ (x0,t0) a real number ui(x,t) ∈ R from his set of feasible controls Ui(x,t,c) ⊆ R+.
Denote the set of all strategies of player i by Si, and let S = ×i∈NSi. Depending on the
state variable and the players’ control variables the system evolves via a set of diﬀerential
equations
(8) ˙ x(t) = g(x(t),u(x(t),t),t), x(t0) = x0,





 x ∈ X,t ∈ [t0,∞),u ∈ U(x,t,c)
	
.
Given the strategy proﬁle u the corresponding utility for player i is deﬁned as Ji(u) =
Ji(x), where x is the (unique) solution to (8). The tuple
(9) Γg,c(x0,t0) = hN,{Si}i∈N,{Ji}i∈Ni
is referred to as a dynamic production game at (x0,t0). Then Γg,c(x0,t0) is seen as subgame
of Γg,c(0,0). A game Γg,c(x0,t0) is called autonomous if gi(x,u,t) = ui for all i ∈ N and
where the strategy spaces are determined for c ∈ C via a Lipschitz-continuous function
hc : RN
+ → RN
+ such that the control spaces are given by Ui(x,t,c) = [0,hc
i(x)] for all
i ∈ N. Denote the family {hc}c∈C by h. We will subsequently be concerned with a ﬁxed
h, and use Γh,c(x0,t0) to denote the autonomous game at (x0,t0) with cost function c and
control spaces that are determined by hc.
A strategy proﬁle (ψ1,...,ψn) is called a Markovian Nash equilibrium for Γg,c(x0,t0) if for
all i ∈ N the corresponding objective function ui 7→ Ji((ψ−i,ui)) is maximized at ui = ψi.
12In addition, the strategy proﬁle (ψ1,...,ψn) is called a Markov perfect Nash equilibrium
for Γg,c(0,0) if it induces a Markov Nash equilibrium for each subgame Γg,c(x0,t0).
Theorem 5.1 Take an autonomous game Γh,c(0,0) = h{1,2},{S1,S2},{J1,J2}i and
suppose that the system of diﬀerential equations speciﬁed by ˙ x(t) = hc(x(t)) has a unique
solution for each initial value x(t0) = x0. Then Markov perfect equilibria in Γh,c(0,0)




i(x) if x ∈ Ri,
0 else.
Proof. Note that the proof is obvious in case fi(0) ≤ Dic(0) for some i. So assume that
the interior of R1 ∩ R2 is nonempty. The pair of strategies ψ = (ψ1,ψ2) ∈ S1 × S2
uniquely deﬁnes a path p∗ with some end-state x∗ in the boundary of R1 ∩ R2. By
assumption on h the end-state production quantities x∗





2) = x∗ Since gi(x(t),u(x(t),t),t) = hc
i(x(t)) > 0 for each i the coordinate
mapping p∗
i is strictly increasing on [0,t∗
i]. Suppose that player i adopts a strategy ϕi
instead of ψi and assume without loss of generality that the pair of strategies (ψ−i,ϕi)
leads to the solution path ¯ p. From (10) we conclude that ¯ p has an end-state ¯ x ∈ R. By
convexity of c and concavity of Fi, the equations Dic(x) = fi(xi) deﬁne xi as a decreasing
function wi of x−i, xi = wi(x−i). Then this yields in combination with (10) ¯ xi ≤ x∗
i. A
graphical representation is given by Figure 1. Let ¯ t be the unique solution to p∗
i(t) = ¯ xi
and α : R+ → R+ such that ¯ pi(α(t)) = p∗
i(t) for all t ∈ [0,¯ t]. Then ﬁrst of all












= Fi(¯ xi) −
Z ¯ t
0
Dic(p∗(t)) · (¯ p ◦ α)0
i(t) dt
But then continue by using the stict convexity of c in order to obtain
Ji(ψ1,ψ2) > Fi(¯ xi) −
Z ¯ t
0
Dic(¯ p ◦ α(t)) · (¯ p ◦ α)0
i(t) dt
= Ji(¯ p ◦ α) = Ji(¯ p) = Ji(ψ−i,ϕi).
This shows basically that the optimal strategy of a player i is to choose his control
as high as possible on his proﬁtable region Ri. A similar reasoning shows that in each
subgame the players perform optimally only when they play with maximal control levels.
By assumption on h a unique solution path for the system of diﬀerential equations with
arbitrary starting point is assured and the earlier reasoning applies here as well to show
13.
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that the formula (10) speciﬁes a Markov Nash equilibrium in the subgame. Finally, assume
that there is some equilibrium other than is speciﬁed by (10). Then there is a subgame
where some player i did not choose his controls maximal almost everywhere along the
equilibrium trajectory. The reasoning in the ﬁrst part of the proof applies here as well in
order to show that i will increase his payoﬀ in this particular subgame by increasing his
controls. Obviously, this contradicts the equilibrium property.
Example 5.2 Consider h = {hc}c∈C with hc
i(x) = 1/Dic(x). Then Theorem 5.1 shows
that in the corresponding Markov perfect Nash Equilibrium each player i chooses his
control equal to 1/Dic(x) as long as marginal costs for his good Yi are lower than marginal
proﬁts. If the end-state is q∗, then in equilibrium each player pays µms(q∗,c). /
Example 5.3 Consider h = {hc}c∈C with hc(x) = eN. The corresponding equilibrium
speciﬁes an equilibrium trajectory that equals the Friedman-Moulin path and if the end-
state is q∗ then the proﬁle of cost shares for the players equals the Friedman-Moulin cost
shares. /
Remark The above theorem can signiﬁcantly be generalized. For the game dynamics g we
only need to assume that for any c ∈ C++ it holds that the mapping ui 7→ g(x,(u−i,ui),t)
is monotonically increasing and Lipschitz continuous. Since in that case we can deﬁne
˜ hc(x,t) = g(x,h(x,t),t) and start Theorem 5.1 with hc = ˜ hc.
146. Designing the appropriate game dynamics
A benevolent planner may use a dynamic production game as a tool to solve the inte-
grated production and cost sharing problem. Theorem 5.1 points out that one way is to
restrict the control spaces of the agents, as they directly inﬂuence the equilibrium proper-
ties. In addition it should be the planners concern that the game rules are fair in the sense
that these constitute an idea of equity by which the players are granted equal ex ante op-
portunities. Basically, we aim at classifying dynamics that satisfy the following properties:
Equilibrium Utility Lowerbound (EUL)
Consider a Markovian Nash equilibrium ψ in the game Γh,c(x0,t0) with end-state x∗. Such










Each agent may obtain any desired amount of his good by an appropriate choice of his
controls, independent from the other players’ strategies.
Scale invariance
Change of unit does not change utility in equilibrium in the following sense. Let s :
RN
+ → RN
+ be a positive transformation of scales. Denote by Γs
h,c(x0,t0) the game
Γh,c◦s−1(s(x0),t0) out of Γh,c(x0,t0) such that the utility for player i along a ﬁnite and







i )0(xi(t)) − Di(c ◦ s−1)(x(t))

˙ xi(t) dt.
Note that indeed c◦s−1 is a strictly convex function. Compare the Markov Nash equilib-
ria and corresponding utility proﬁles of the two-player games Γg,c(x0,t0) and Γs
g,c(x0,t0),
that are related via the positive transform of scales s. Suppose that in each Markov-
ian Nash equilibrium of Γg,c(x0,t0) the utilities are uniquely determined by the proﬁle
(J ∗
1 ,J ∗
2 ). Then the proﬁle of utilities in each Markovian Nash equilibrium in the scaled
game Γs
g,c(x0,t0) equals (J ∗
1 ,J ∗
2 ) as well.
Theorem 6.1 Consider the class of autonomous production games with the properties
SI, EUL, and FD. Each such game has a unique Markov perfect Nash equilibrium iﬀ
this equilibrium is equivalent to that in the game with h such that hc
i(x) = (Dic(x))−1.
15Proof. Let c be a given cost function in C, and x∗ the solution to the system of diﬀerential
equations 
˙ x(t) = hc
i(x(t)),
x(0) = 0.
Assume for the moment that limt→∞ x∗
i = ∞ for both i = 1 as well as i = 2. (It is here
where we need something like free disposal to close the proof.) Take any output vector
q∗ ∈ R2












i − qi,0} for all qi ∈ R+.
Then q∗ is the end-state in equilibrium for the equilibrium proﬁle ψ∗ with equilibrium








Note that in any game with end-state q∗ the equilibrium trajectory is the same in any
game Γh,c(0,0), and in particular that induced by p∗. We conclude that each q∗ ∈ R∗
+ can








Note that by varying over all proﬁles (q∗,c) the above equation (11) deﬁnes a cost sharing
mechanism. Below we show that given the assumptions (b)-(d) that this cost sharing
mechanism equals the Moulin-Shenker rule µms.
As the utilities of the players are unaﬀected by changes of unit scale, this mechanism must
be scale invariant. Moreover, the lower bound on utility implies that µ satisﬁes UPP.
Then by UPP and continuity of hc it holds that D1c(x) = D2c(x) implies hc
1(x) = hc
2(x).
Otherwise we can construct a subgame according to which the lowerbound on utility is
not satisﬁed in equilibrium, as the induced cost shares are not consistent with UPP.
Deﬁne the change of scale s(x) = (D1c(x0)x1,D2c(x0)x2) and denote by ¯ x the equilib-
rium path in the scaled game Γs
h,c(x0,t0). Note that by this particular choice of s we get
Di(c ◦ s−1)(s(x0)) = 1 for i = 1,2. Hence, the lower bound on equilibrium utility in the
game Γs
h,c(x0,t0) together with continuity of the functions in the family h imply
(12) hc◦s−1
1 (s(x0)) = hc◦s−1
2 (s(x0)).
Moreover, the utility along the equilibrium path ¯ x in Γs
h,c(x0,t0) equals Js(¯ x) = J(s−1◦¯ x).
Note that from (12) we may conclude that
(13)
(s−1 ◦ ¯ x)0
1(t0)






















Assume without loss of generality that hc
1(x0)D1c(x0) < hc
2(x0)D2c(x0) and assume more-








for all x ∈ [x0,s−1(¯ x(¯ t))].
Note that we used continuity of hc here. By Theorem 5.1 the equilibrium utility for player
1 is met when both players use maximal controls. Let x∗ be the corresponding equilibrium
path in Γh,c(x0,t0). Deﬁne the path ˜ x by ˜ x(t) = s−1(¯ x(¯ t))∧x∗(t). Then a reasoning similar
to that in the proof of Theorem 5.1 shows that
J1(x∗) ≥ J1(˜ x) > J1(s−1 ◦ ¯ x) = Js
1(¯ x).
In particular this shows that equilibrium utility has changed by scaling through s, which









for all x ∈ int(R1 ∩ R2).
Therefore, in int(R1 ∩ R2) the costs along the equilibrium path are equally shared. But
then the induced cost sharing mechanism µ is self-consistent as each Markov perfect Nash
equilbrium is time-consistent. Hence, we proved that µ has all the properties enlisted
in Theorem 4.4 and must therefore equal µms. In turn this implies that the equilibrium
trajectories are in fact the image of the Moulin-Shenker path. Finally, each such equilib-
rium is represented by the equilibrium in the game where we set hc




The above analysis is merely concerned with autonomous diﬀerential games without
any time-dependency. Nevertheless, the above analysis does not change much if we would




e−rit (fi(xi(t) − Dic(x(t)))) ˙ xi dt.
This is due to the fact that the shape of the proﬁtable regions is not inﬂuenced by such
adaptation.
178. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.6 Take c ∈ C, normalized. We will show that there for any  > 0













By continuity of the partial derivatives of c there is a t() > 0 such that for all t ≤ t()














































Then, of course, this proves (15). If |N| = 1 the statement is obviously true by budget
balance.
Proof of Lemma 4.3 Let µ be a continuous cost sharing mechanism that satisﬁes
no exploitation and self consistency. We will deﬁne a collection of paths by which µ is
generated. Let p0,c,N be the set {q ∈ RN
+ |µi(q,c) =
c(q)
n for all i ∈ N}. We claim the
following:
(i) For each t ≥ 0 there is exactly one q ∈ p0,c,N with c(q) = t.
(ii) If q,q0 ∈ p0,c,N,q 6= q0 either q  q0 or q0  q.
First we will prove (i). The ﬁrst step consists of showing that there is at least one
such q for all t ∈ R+. For t = 0, obviously there is only such q and that is q = 0. Let
t > 0 and deﬁne A(t) to be the isocost surface for c at level t. Then h : A(t) → ∆N
with h(q) = q/
P
i∈N qi for all q ∈ A(t) deﬁnes a homeomorphism. Denote its continuous
inverse by h−1. Next deﬁne the mapping g : ∆N → ∆N by g(q) = t−1µ(h−1(q),c). Then
by continuity of both q 7→ µ(q,c) and h−1, it follows that g is continuous. Note that for
all q ∈ ∆N it holds that {qi = 0 ⇒ gi(q) = 0} by no exploitation. We are ready if we
prove that there is a z ∈ ∆N such that gi(z) = 1
n for all i ∈ N. Deﬁne G : ∆N → ∆N by
Gi(q) =






for all i ∈ N.
We claim that G(z) = z implies gi(z) = 1
n for all i ∈ N. Suppose the opposite, G(z) = z
while not gi(z) = 1





n − gj(z),0} > 0 and therefore Gi(z) < zi + max{ 1
n − gi(z),0}. For
i = k this converts to Gk(z) < zk, which leads to contradiction.
Observe that G(∆N) ⊂ ∆N, since by no exploitation Gi(q) > 0, also for the case qi = 0.
But now we are there, since by invoking Brouwer’s Theorem we guarantee existence of
such a ﬁxed point z for G.
Now, we turn to proving uniqueness. Suppose that for q1,q2 ∈ p0,c,N such that q1 6= q2,
it holds that c(q1) = c(q2). Deﬁne q∗ := q1 ∨ q2. Then, in particular it holds that q∗ > q1
and thus c(q∗) > c(q1). By self-consistency we have µ(q∗,c) = µ(q1,c) + µ(q∗ − q1,cq1
)
and µ(q∗,c) = µ(q2,c) + µ(q∗ − q2,cq2
). Since µ(q1,c) = µ(q2,c), it holds that
(17) µ(q∗ − q1,cq1
) = µ(q∗ − q2,cq2
).




i , so by no exploitation the cost share of
agent i is either 0 in the cost sharing problem (q∗ −q1,cq1
) or in the cost sharing problem
(q∗ − q2,cq2
). But then by equality (17) we get µ(q∗ − q1,cq1
) = 0, and consequently








So, this proves our ﬁrst claim.
Then, a direct consequence of (i) is that each t ≥ 0 deﬁnes a unique bundle y(t) ∈ p0,c,N
such that c(y(t)) = t. We will prove that the mapping y : t 7→ y(t) is continuous.
Continuity at t = 0 is obvious. Suppose on the contrary that there is t∗ > 0 and a
sequence t1,t2,... in R++ such that limk→∞ tk = t∗, while the sequence y(t1),y(t2),...
does not converge to y(t∗). Take  > 0 such that B := {z ∈ RN
+ |ky(t∗) − zk < } is
contained in RN
+, while there is a subsequence t0
1,t0
2,... of t1,t2,... such that for each
k ∈ N, y(t0
k) 6∈ B. Deﬁne r := maxk∈N t0
k. Then the sequence y(t0
1),y(t0
2),... is contained
in the compact set {z ∈ RN





2,... such that y(t00
1),y(t00
2),... converges, say to q. Observe that q 6= y(t∗). By


















Consequently, also q ∈ p0,c,N and c(q) = t∗, but with y(t∗) as the unique vector satisfying
these conditions, we reached a contradiction. So, y is continuous.
We will now prove (ii). Take q,q0 ∈ p0,c,N such that q 6= q0. Then (i) implies c(q) 6= c(q0).
Without loss of generality we will assume that c(q0) < c(q). Suppose that not q0  q. By
the continuity of y, there is a maximal t0 < c(q0) such that y(t0) ∈ [0,q]. Hence, by self
consistency,
µ(q,c) = µ(y(t0),c) + µ(q − y(t0),cy(t0)).
19But for all i ∈ N, we have µi(q,c) − µi(y(t0),c) = 1
n(c(q) − c(y(t0))), and therefore corre-
sponding to µ all shares in the problem (q − y(t0),cy(t0)) are equal. However, t0 is taken
such that (q −y(t0))i = 0 for at least one coordinate i ∈ N. Then, by no exploitation, the
corresponding cost share of agent i is 0, hence the corresponding cost shares for the others
are also 0. On the other hand, cost shares sum up to the total cost cy(t0)(q −y(t0)), which




µi(q − y(t0),cy(t0)) = c(q) − t0 > 0,
a contradiction. Therefore q0  q, which ascertains the validity of our second claim.
Now (i) together with (ii) show that p0,c,N is the image of a path, which we will de-
note by π0,c,N.







cd((0N\S,q)) for all i ∈ S

.
Then, essentially by the same reasoning as before, it follows that pd,c,S is the image of a
path πd,c,S. Take again d0 as element of one of the previously deﬁned sets pd,c,S, and let









((0N\S1,q)) for all i ∈ S1

.
Again, essentially the same techniques as before show that this is the image of a path for
S1. In exactly the same way we proceed inductively by deﬁning paths for coalitions of
decreasing size. At the end of this procedure there still may be combinations (d,c,S) left
for which πd,c,S is not deﬁned; for any of those triples we take πd,c,S to be an arbitrary
path. Then this completes the deﬁnition of a path collection Π.
It is now an easy exercise to show that it constitutes µ, or µ = µΠ. Let q ∈ RN
+.
Suppose q ∈ π0,c,N(R+). Then according to µΠ, costs c(q) are split equally. But recall the
deﬁnition of p0,c,N which contains q, in order to see that the same division is made in case
of µ. If q 6∈ π0,c,N(R+), then let t1 be the ﬁrst moment that π0,c,N meets the demands
of the agents N1. Let d1 := π0,c,N(t1) and suppose that (q − d1)N\N1 ∈ πd1,c,N\N1(R+).
First notice that µi(d1,c) = 1
nc(d1) for all i ∈ N. Suppose that the vector of remaining







20Thus, by self consistency for all i ∈ N\N1,









(q − d1) = µΠ(q,c).
If not (q − d1)N\N1 ∈ πd1,c,N\N1(R+), then proceed by following πd1,c,N\N1 up to the ﬁrst
moment t2 that some agents N2 ⊂ N\N1 are satisﬁed with the present production level.
Then the previous reasoning can just be replicated until, ﬁnally, a point is reached at which
the remaining demand bundle is on the corresponding path for the remaining demanders.
Proof of Theorem 4.4 It is clear that on G the Moulin-Shenker rule obeys all the
enlisted principles.
Now suppose that µ is a cost sharing rule satisfying CONT, SI, NOEXP, SCONS and
(5). We will show that µ = µms in the following way.
By Lemma 4.3 it follows that µ is generated by a path collection Π. Thus µ satisﬁes
the serial principle according to Lemma ??. There is no unique way to describe Π; all
other path collections resulting from choosing other parametrizations for the paths in Π
generate µ as well. Then it suﬃces to prove that a path collection by which µ is gener-
ated can be chosen such that it equals Γ, one of the path collections corresponding to the
Moulin-Shenker rule. Therefore the theorem will be proved if we show that, starting with
an arbitrary path collection Π generating µ, for all (d,c,S) ∈ RN × C × P(N) the path
πd,c,S ∈ Π is equal to γd,c,S up to parametrization.
We claim that there is a parametrization ¯ π of π0,c,N, which is a solution to the above
system of diﬀerential equations (7). Then ¯ π must coincide with γ0,c,N by uniqueness of
the solution.
Then by simple variations the same reasoning shows that all paths of type π0,cd,S are equal
to γ0,cd,S up to parametrization, for all d ∈ RN and S ∈ P(N).
First, we will show that πd,c,S(R+) = π0,cd,S(R+). We need only to consider those proﬁles
d, which can actually be produced using the path collection Π and the above construction.
Suppose we have an inequality instead and that a cost sharing problem (q,c) the path
constructed from Π reaches the proﬁle d after a speciﬁc period.
Then the path πd,c,S is used in the above construction from the very moment where all
agents in N\S are satisﬁed with production. Still, their individual completion times for
production may diﬀer. At least the agents in S will have made equal contributions to the
procedure of equally splitting incremental costs for raising production levels, since they
have not completed yet. So we have µi(d,c) = µj(d,c) for all i,j ∈ S.
Let q ∈ d+(πd,c,S(R+),0N\S) and assume that q 6∈ d+(π0,cd,S(R+),0N\S). Then also the
21payments for the cost sharing problem (q,c) according to the rule µ are the same for the
individual agents in S, or µi(q,c) = µj(q,c) for all i,j ∈ S. Applying SCONS gives
µi(q,c) = µi(d,c) + µi(q − d,cd) for i ∈ S.
So, actually the cost shares for the reduced cost sharing problem (q−d,cd) must be equal
for the agents in S, µi(q − d,cd) = µj(q − d,cd) for all i,j ∈ S. Recall the construction of
sharing the cost in the cost sharing problem (q − d,cd). First the production plan π0,cd,S
is used in order to deﬁne the ﬁrst production level y at which a set S0 of agents in S are
satisﬁed with the production so far. By assumption, however, this cannot be the proﬁle
q − d. So y < q − d. Now the incremental cost for bringing production from level 0 up
to y are split equally among the members of S. Then the procedure continues in order to
divide the remaining costs cd(q −d)−cd(y) among the agents S\S0, which is a nonempty
set. Because cd(q −d)−cd(y) > 0 this means that there is at least one agent in S\S0 that
pays more than any of the agents in S0. So there are diﬀerences in cost shares of agents
in S which gives the desired contradiction.
In the proof we roughly distinguish between four steps.
Step 1: The properties SP, SI and (5) allow us to specify Dπ0,c,N up to multiplica-
tion with a scalar y under the assumptions of existence of Dπ0,c,N and Dπ0,c,N  0. We





This is proved as follows. Suppose all partial derivatives of π0,c,N are strictly positive.




for all i ∈ N,u ∈ RN.
Then by scale invariance for any q ∈ RN the problem (q,c) is equivalent with (f−1(q),c◦f).
But the latter one is normalized in the sense that for all i, Di(c◦f)(0) = Dic(0)Dif(0) = 1.































It is not diﬃcult to prove the following. Let h,g : R+ → R+ be continuous mappings for





= α =⇒ h0(0) = αg0(0).







By taking y such that D1π0,c,N(0) =
y
D1c(0) we prove our claim.
For q ∈ RN we deﬁne tq := argmin{π0,c,N(t) ≥ q}. Then tq stands for the ﬁrst mo-
ment that π0,c,N reaches the boundary of the cube {u ∈ RN |u ≤ q}.
Step 2: Take d ∈ π0,c,N(R+),d 6= 0. Note that d is a demand proﬁle for which µ
determines equal cost shares. Assume now that Dπ0,cd,N(0) exists and Dπ0,cd,N(0)  0.





Essentially this is proved with the techniques from Step 1 together with the property
SCONS. Applying Step 1 for cd instead of c immediately provides us with a y ∈ R+ such











On the other hand we ﬁnd another expression for Diπ0,cd,N(0) by the relation between
π0,cd,N and π0,c,N. By SCONS and the fact that µi(d,c) =
c(d)
|N| , we have for all d0 ≥




+ µi(d0 − d,cd).
Since d0 is also a demand proﬁle for which µ determines equal cost shares, it holds for all
i ∈ N




But µi(d0 − d,cd) = µj(d0 − d,cd) for all i,j ∈ N if and only if the ﬁrst splitting point for
the problem (d0−d,cd) is d0−d, or equivalently d0−d ∈ π0,cd,N(R+). So d0 ∈ π0,c,N(R+) if
23and only if d0 ∈ π0,cd,N(R+)+d. This in turn implies π0,cd,N(R+) = π0,c,N([td,∞)). Since
only the images of the paths matter we may assume that π0,cd,N(t) = π0,c,N(td + t) − d











The mapping π0,c,N is monotonically increasing and therefore diﬀerentiable almost every-
where. If only Dπ0,c,N  0 almost everywhere, then we are done: the result from Step 2
applies for almost every d ∈ π0,c,N(R+), which in turn implies (21).
Let
(22) ˜ π := π0,c,N ◦ (c ◦ π0,c,N)−1.
Then ˜ π is a parametrization of π0,c,N by the costs; for each t ∈ R+ it holds that c(˜ π(t)) = t.





















= |N|b(c)−1 > 0.
This implies that whenever ˜ π is diﬀerentiable at t, then ˜ π0(t)  0. But consequently
˜ π0  0 almost everywhere, since it is a monotonically increasing function. There is only
one possibility, and that is Dπ0,c,N  0 almost everywhere. This proves our claim.
Step 4: The last part of the proof is of rather technical nature. We will show now that
the above ˜ π can be used to deﬁne the proper parametrization of π0,c,N that we are looking
for.
Note, that given the fact that π0,c,N is monotonically increasing we have for almost all
t ∈ R+:
(i): π0,c,N is diﬀerentiable at (c ◦ π0,c,N)−1(t) and
Dπ0,c,N((c ◦ π0,c,N)−1(t)) > 0.
(ii): c ◦ π0,c,N is diﬀerentiable at (c ◦ π0,c,N)−1(t) and
(c ◦ π0,c,N)0((c ◦ π0,c,N)−1(t)) > 0.
So for the parametrization ˜ π of π0,c,N, deﬁned above by (22), the following equality holds
almost everywhere, for all i ∈ N
24Di˜ π(t) =
Diπ0,c,N((c ◦ π0,c,N)−1(t))







Consider the curve ¯ π := ˜ π◦ϕ, where ϕ(t) = |N|t for all t ∈ R+. Then ¯ π is a parametriza-





If we can show that this equality holds for all t ∈ R+, then we are done. Since then we
showed that ¯ π is actually the parametrization of π0,c,N that we were looking for, because
¯ π = γ0,c,N. The mapping ¯ π is Lipschitz continuous: for all t1,t2 ∈ R+,
k¯ π(t1) − ¯ π(t2)k = k˜ π(|N|t1) − ˜ π(|N|t2)k
≤ a(c)−1|c(˜ π(|N|t1)) − c(˜ π(|N|t2))|
= |N|a(c)−1|t1 − t2|.








By the continuity of the mapping s 7→ Dic(¯ π(s))−1, it follows that ¯ π is diﬀerentiable and




for all t ∈ R+.
But then ¯ π is a solution of the system of diﬀerential equations that determines the Moulin-
Shenker path γ0,c,N. By uniqueness of the solution ¯ π must coincide with γ0,c,N. This proves
our claim that π0,c,N has the same image as γ0,c,N.
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